Plaintiff, who was being treated for hairy-cell leukemia, allowed the removal of his spleen and repeated cell samples under the belief that this was necessary for his health. Physician servants of the Defendant used his tissue to develop and patent a cell line for commercial use. Plaintiff sued for conversion and breach of nondisclosure observations.
Questions of law
What ownership interest does an individual maintain in bodily tissue? What are the limits of conversion with respect to ownership interests?
Conclusions
The court found that plaintiff did not have a sufficient ownership interest to sustain a claim for conversion, no matter how egregious the defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent were.
Two thieves, Bernaradini and Ricci, arranged to “purchase” broken barrels from a landlord which they knew to be valuable. The landlord sold his tenant’s barrels to them for a small sum. The tenant sued for the value of the barrels (about $51,000 in 2020 dollars).
Questions of law
What role does intent play in conversion? If a defendant believed the property of no value, is he to be held responsible for its full value?
Conclusions
The court found that the only requirement for conversion to lie was the intent to commit the tortious act, not any particular special knowledge or wrongful mental state. “Conceding all that may be argued as to the absence of improper motives, he sold barrels that did not belong to him and which did with their contents belong to the plaintiff.”
Defendant, a former employee of Plaintiff, persistently sent emails critical of Plaintiff to all Plaintiff employees using Plaintiff’s intranet. After repeated requests to Defendant to cease and desist, Plaintiff sued, alleging trespass to chattels.
Questions of law
Is actual injury a requirement for trespass to chattels? Can frustration with the content of a communication give rise to a claim for trespass to chattels via the mode of the communication? What is the impact of intent?
Conclusion
In a lengthy opinion, the California Supreme Court held that it would be an unacceptable expansion of tort liability to expand trespass to chattels to include the use, however unwelcome, of a publicly-accessible computer intranet which caused no injury to the system. The example was made to mailboxes or telephones — the content of communication in no way injures the operation of the mailbox or the telephone equipment.
Plaintiff brought suit for negligence against Dr. Pence, a neurosurgeon who had performed a laminectomy. Because of inflammation, the laminectomy was unsuccessful and the patient was paralyzed after a fall at the hospital. Defendant did not disclose risk of paralysis and estimated it to be “only 1%” in testimony. Plaintiff only brought adverse witnesses and personal testimony and the trial court granted defendant motions for directed verdict.
Questions of law
What obligation does a physician have to disclose risks of therapy to a patient? Does a physician have discretion to withhold disclosure of risks? On what basis should causality be evaluated?
Conclusion
The court reversed, finding that the trial court had erred in granting directed verdicts, as there was sufficient testimony to put the question of negligence before the jury. A physician has the privilege to withhold information from a patient but not to avoid the disclosure rule; rather, such a decision is a medical decision and is subject to the same standard of malpractice. Causality is based on whether the disclosure of risk would have changed the choice and thereby the outcome. Holding it to be too difficult to make a subjective determination of what a patient would have done, the court rather called for a test based on whether adequate disclosure could reasonably be expected to have caused a prudent person in the patient’s position to decline the treatment.
Defendants engaged in the construction of a reservoir employed contractors who failed to use proper care and skill, and accordingly water broke out of the reservoir and damaged plaintiff’s property.
Question of law
Does a lack of knowledge or intent indemnify a defendant from liability for harm done by their actions? What if the fault lies with their agents? “What is the obligation which the law casts on a person who lawfully brings on his land something which, harmless whilst it remain there, will naturally do mischief if it escape out of his hand?”
Conclusions
The court held that as the plaintiff’s rights had been infringed as a result of actions which would have been unlawful if they had been done intentionally, the defendants ought to be held liable. They knew the mine workings could extend in any direction and therefore they acted at their own peril.
“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”
Prior to a heavy storm, defendant Lake Erie Transportation Company had its steamship Reynolds moored to a dock owned by plaintiff Vincent for the unloading of cargo. The wind became strong, and no tug was available to tow the Reynolds to another dock. Rather than casting off, defendant kept the lines secure to the dock, adding more to keep the steamship secure in the face of the increasing storm, and as a result the dock was damaged by repeated impacts with the Reynolds. Plaintiff sued for damages.
Questions of law
Does the doctrine of necessity preclude recovery for damages caused by an act arising out of necessity?
Finding
The court held that although the act of maintaining the mooring was not negligent and was justified by necessity, the plaintiff could still reasonably be called to pay the cost of damages brought on by the act. The necessity of the actions did mean it could not be held liable for any injury resulting to the property of others.
“Theologians hold that a starving man may, without moral guilt, take what is necessary to sustain life but it could hardly be said that the obligation would not be upon such person to pay the value of the property so taken when he became able to do so.”
During a heavy storm, Ploof and his family moored their sloop to a dock owned by Putnam. Putnam’s employee unmoored the sloop, causing it and its contents to be destroyed by the storm and causing bodily harm to Ploof and his family. Plaintiffs Ploof brought actions for trespass and negligent infliction of harm against Putnam.
Questions of law
What does the doctrine of necessity permit? Can an action be brought against an individual who resists torts protected by necessity?
Finding
The court held that the “doctrine of necessity applies with special force to the preservation of human life” and accordingly the case disclosed a necessity for mooring the sloop at the dock. Necessity was not only in force with respect to mooring, but to mooring at the most immediate point, the dock.
Holbrook owned a walled tulip garden which had been the subject of frequent burglaries. In an attempt to capture the burglar, as attested by witnesses, he set a spring gun. This gun discharged when tripped by Bird, a neighbor who was attempting to retrieve a lost peafowl, causing serious injuries. Bird sued for battery.
Questions of law
To what lengths may a property owner go to protect his property? To what standard should passive or active measures be held? Should Holbrook have given notice or warning of the spring gun? Did it matter that Holbrook intended to injure intruders rather than merely deterring them?
Finding
The court held that Holbrook’s intention to injure, rather than deter, was a strong element in finding for Bird. Although the court reviewed multiple prior cases, it then divested itself of them, stating:
“We want no authority in a case like the present; we put it on the principle that it is inhuman to catch a man by means which may maim him or endanger his life, and, as far as human means can go, it is the object of English law to uphold humanity.”
The court did not go so far as to say that a spring gun could not be used, but did state that notice ought to be given when such means of protection are used. It also noted that Bird’s status as a mere trespasser rather than a burglar affected Holbrook’s liability, stating, “if the Defendant had been present, he would not have been authorized even in taking him into custody, and no man can do indirectly that which he is forbidden to do directly.” Because Holbrook intended to cause serious bodily harm to trespassers, he was responsible for whatever was caused indirectly.
Defendant, an insane person, was being cared for by plaintiff, who was aware of defendant’s mental state. During an episode, defendant struck plaintiff on the head, causing serious injuries. The trial court refused to enter a directed verdict for the defendant; defendant appealed.
Questions of law
Can a mentally ill or deranged person form the requisite intent to commit battery? Does a caretaker for a deranged person assume the risk of injury?
Finding
The court entered a judgment for the plaintiff. The court found that the caretaker did not consent or assume the risk, and held that the defendant “was capable of entertaining and…did entertain an intent to strike and to injure the plaintiff and that she acted upon that intent.” It reviewed, but ignored, concerns that the single-intent formulation of tort liability was too strict or archaic. It also discussed public policy grounds for such a view, arguing that an insane person ought to be required to pay for damages done, if he is able.
Defendant arranged and promoted an illegal prizefight in which the plaintiff was a willing participant. The plaintiff suffered injuries and sued defendant and his opponent, though failed to serve his opponent. Dismissed by trial court.
Questions of law
Can a third party who encourages or arranges for injury to another be held liable for battery? Does the consent of the victim have any effect? Is the legality of a prize fight an element?
Finding
The court reversed, holding that the illegality of the fight promotion rendered the defendant promoter liable for plaintiff’s injuries regardless of whether the plaintiff could have successfully sued his opponent. The court invoked reference to strict liability and cited numerous statutes and legislative declarations concerning the proper management and administration of legal prize fights. Because the fight was illegal, the question of consent or assumption of risk was moot.
incuriousity 