Dispute

Following a workplace injury, longtime employee and plaintiff I. G. Katz was offered a pension in exchange for retirement by defendant Dare, who would have fired Katz if he had not accepted it. Three years later, when Katz was 70 years old, Dare stopped making payments and claimed Katz was capable of working. Katz sued under promissory estoppel.

Rules of law

There are three elements that invoke Promissory Estoppel: promise, detrimental reliance, and injustice which compels enforcement.

Arguments

Defendant argued that because plaintiff would have been fired if he had not voluntarily retired, the elements of Promissory Estoppel had not been met. Defendant argued that the pension from Dare did not require Katz to do anything and thus there was no detrimental reliance. Plaintiff argued that he had relied on the promise to his detriment by voluntarily quitting.

Conclusions

The court held that the alternative of firing was immaterial, as the defendant had negotiated a voluntary termination for thirteen months, and plaintiff had in fact relied upon the promise in voluntarily quitting.

Dispute

The decedent plaintiff had been driving without lights, in violation of statute, when he was struck and killed by a negligent defendant. The jury was instructed that driving without lights was not negligence in itself and therefore found the decedent free of contributory negligence. Appealed, and the appellate court reversed for error in instructions. Appealed again.

Questions of law

Does violation of statute on the part of a defendant constitute contributory negligence?

Conclusion

Because the violation of the statute contributed to the accident, it was potential negligence and the plaintiff could have been barred from recovery. The jury should have evaluated causation but not negligence. “A plaintiff who travels without [lights] is not to forfeit the right to damages unless the absence of lights is at least a contributing cause of the disaster.”

Dispute

A drug-store clerk negligently sold unlabeled poison to a customer, who drank it and died. A statute required the labeling of poisons. Decedent’s estate sued.

Questions of law

Does a statute impose a specific duty in the context of tort liability, and does such a statute give rise to a right of action under that statute?

Conclusion

The common law gives a right of action to every one sustaining injuries caused proximately by the negligence of another, and since negligence is the breach of legal duty, breach of a legal duty imposed by statute (presuming that statute is designed for the protection of others) is negligence per se.

Dispute

A plaintiff was injured by a runaway horse which had been left unhitched by defendant in violation of local ordinance.

Questions of law

Can a jury evaluate negligence under an “ordinary and prudent” standard when the injurious act was in violation of statute?

Conclusions

The court held that “ordinary and prudent” becomes synonymous with adherence to the law in the question of liability evaluation, and as such a jury is not permitted to evaluate the question of negligence, but only whether the law was broken and whether the damage resulted from it.

Dispute

A minority shareholder in Greyhound attempted to sue Greyhound in Delaware by sequestration of stocks which were situated in Delaware under statute. The sequestrator “seized” these stocks by placing a stop transfer order on them and the suit proceeded. 21 defendants, none of whom were in Delaware, entered special appearance to quash jurisdiction. Trial court rejected the motion and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. Defendants appealed to SCOTUS.

Questions of law

Where does the line fall for quasi in rem jurisdiction and the attachment of property for the purposes of recognizing jurisdiction?

Conclusions

SCOTUS reasoned to abandon the in rem policy from Pennoyer, choosing instead to move toward the test of “fair play and substantial justice” from International Shoe. This is not a total abandonment of in rem because, as they say, “when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy…it would be unusual for the State where the property is located to not have jurisdiction.” They found that pulling someone into a jurisdiction merely because of property, without a controversy touching that property, presented a fairness problem. “We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”

SCOTUS overturned.

Dispute

Foreign plaintiffs, Argentinian nationals, attempted to sue foreign defendant Daimler, as owner of its Argentinian subsidiary, for war crime participation by that subsidiary. They brought suit in California by service on the US subsidiary, which was incorporated in Delaware but had substantial business contacts and properties in California. The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed on grounds substantially similar to a purposeful availment theory. Appealed to SCOTUS.

Questions of law

When does a corporation’s contacts with a forum rise to a level granting personal jurisdiction over matters unrelated to those contacts?

Conclusions

Ginsburg, writing for the majority, argued that the Ninth Circuit had erred both in permitting to allow the US subsidiary to stand as agent for defendant and in extending general jurisdiction over events and plaintiffs not only outside the forum state, but on an entirely different continent. The subsidiary’s contacts with the forum would have been sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, but were not enough to show that it was “at home” in the state.

Dispute

Defendants agreed to purchase a food truck business, with equipment, from plaintiff. They reached a verbal agreement and defendants paid $10,000 cash while waiting on a bank loan for the remaining $140,000. They took possession and operated the food truck for a season while the title remained in the plaintiff’s name. Thereafter, they attempted to return it and claimed no contract existed. They said the $10,000 was a fee to operate while they explored purchasing, but the bank did in fact grant them the loan. The trial court found for defendants; plaintiff appealed.

Rules of law

Under the UCC, a goods contract may be made in any way that shows agreement, including the conduct of the parties. A contract may issue even if the moment of its making is undetermined. Even if terms are left uncertain, intent and reasonable certainty of remedy govern.

Arguments

The defendants argued that the business was not a “good” under the UCC and argued that the supposed oral contract was too vague to be enforceable. The plaintiff argued that the essential terms were agreed upon and the only remaining elements were performance, and did not timely return the business.

Conclusion

The court found that there was a contract, that there was more than just an agreement to agree, and that the defendants breached. Reversed.

Dispute

Plaintiff Dohrmann sued the defendant Swaney, executor of the estate of his neighbor Mrs. Rogers, for damages under a purported contract. Mrs. Rogers had, in the contract, agreed to give him her apartment and $4 million for “past and future services” and in exchange for “incorporating” her last name into the names of his children. The trial court granted summary judgment against plaintiff, who appealed.

Rules of law

A contract requires consideration, and the question of whether consideration is sufficient is a matter of law. Where the amount of consideration is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court, the contract will fail. When there is a gross inadequacy of consideration, the relative fairness of the contract and circumstances of unequal bargaining power may be considered in determining whether to set aside the contract.

Arguments

Plaintiff asserted that perpetuating Mrs. Rogers’ name by adding it to those of his children was bargained-for and sought consideration. He also said that the court did not have grounds to examine the relative value of consideration, only to determine whether it exists. The Estate argued that the contract was entered into fraudulently and that because the name was not added as a surname, it did not meet the goal of perpetuating her name.

Conclusion

The court affirmed, finding that not only was the consideration grossly inadequate, but it was in a sense nonexistent, since the only supposed benefit, changing the children’s names, was not enforceable against them since they could freely change their names in the future. There was also substantial unfairness associated with the formation of the contract and had to be set aside.

Dispute

A defendant, attempting to break up a fight between his dog and the plaintiff’s, swung a stick behind him and struck the plaintiff in the eye. The jury found for the plaintiff after the trial judge’s instructions that the defendant would be liable if his actions were unnecessary and he had not exercised “extraordinary” care.

Questions of law

What is the basis of action for negligence in tort law? How did negligence arise from intentional torts? Shall a defendant be liable if his intention was not unlawful and the injury was unavoidable?

Conclusions

The court explored the concept of “ordinary care” as a common binder of negligence. An “inevitable accident” is an accident which could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care necessary to the context. The judge found that if the act of hitting the plaintiff was unintentional and was done in pursuit of a lawful act, then the defendant would not be liable unless he had not met a standard of ordinary care.

Dispute

Plaintiff Robert Nicastro sustained injury in New Jersey while using machinery manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, a British company. The machinery had been sold into via a scrap recycling vendor operating independent of J. McIntyre. The NJ Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was proper; J. McIntyre appealed to SCOTUS.

Questions of law

Where is the line between the “stream of commerce” argument (see Asahi and World Wide Volkswagen) and the requirement of purposeful availment established in Hanson?

Do a defendant’s actions or a defendant’s expectations control whether purposeful availment has been met?

Conclusion

The court overturned the New Jersey court finding, with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority opinion. The court stated that while the stream of commerce argument may provide sufficient contacts within a forum, it does not itself “amend the general rule” of personal jurisdiction. It states, “The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.” It was not enough, the court said, that the defendant might have predicted its goods would reach a forum state.

A defendant’s actions, not expectations, control. It is also stated explicitly that these provisions apply to domestic producers. The defendant did not engage in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey, despite agreeing that its products would end up within the United States generally and promoting distribution generally within the United States.

“None of our precedents find that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient.”